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ABSTRACT 
This article considers whether the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau Director’s appointment of the Bureau’s Deputy Director 
comports with the Appointments Clause.  The Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act established the Bureau 
in July 2010, as well as the offices of the Bureau’s Director and 
Deputy Director, to coordinate the regulation and enforcement of 
federal consumer-financial-protection laws.  Under that act, the 
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Director appoints the Deputy Director.1  The Appointments Clause 
permits “Heads of Departments” to appoint inferior officers like the 
Deputy Director.  But it is unclear if the Bureau is a “department” 
and thus if the Director is a department head who can appoint the 
Deputy Director.2  Although I argue that the Bureau should be 
deemed a department, I explain why the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board3 
and prior Appointments Clause jurisprudence suggest otherwise.  
Indeed, this article provides one of the first analyses and applications 
of the new definition of “department” announced in Free Enterprise 
Fund. 
An inferior officer’s appointment (that of a deputy, no less) may 
seem inconsequential.  But an invalid appointment could, depending 
on the Deputy Director’s duties, lead to unnecessary, time-consuming 
litigation and perhaps even the invalidation of agency actions for the 
newly established Bureau in its formative years.  If so, the Bureau’s 
opponents may have an additional, yet until now unnoticed, means of 
disrupting the new Bureau.  Congress should, without delay, remedy 
the Deputy Director’s potentially improper appointment.  
INTRODUCTION 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
enacted in July 2010, established the controversial Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection.4  Controversy continued when 
President Obama appointed Elizabeth Warren, Harvard Law School 
professor and former Chair of the Congressional Oversight Panel, as 
“Assistant to the President” to oversee the Bureau’s creation.5  
                                                            
 1. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011(b)(5), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) (to be 
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491). 
 2. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[T]he Congress may by Law vest the 
appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, 
in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”). 
 3. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
 4. Dodd-Frank Act § 1011, 124 Stat. at 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491); 
Jesse Lee, President Obama Signs Wall Street Reform:  No Easy Task, THE WHITE HOUSE 
BLOG (July 21, 2010, 2:22 PM), 
 http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/07/21/president-obama-signs-wall-street-
reform-no-easy-task; Jim Puzzanghera, Consumer protection deal is near; Auto dealers are 
likely to be largely exempt from the proposed agency’s oversight, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 2010, at 
B1 (explaining that some groups opposed the agency because of concerns that it 
would unnecessarily expand government control over the economy). 
 5. Elizabeth Warren, Fighting to Protect Consumers, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Sept. 
17, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/09/17/fighting-protect-
consumers (“The President asked me, and I enthusiastically agreed, to serve as an 
Assistant to the President and Special Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury on the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.  He has also asked me to take on the job to 
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Although the Senate would have had to consent for Warren to 
become the Bureau’s Director,6 its approval was unnecessary for her 
appointment as Assistant to the President.7  Her appointment created 
significant debate as to whether the President made an improper 
end-run around the Appointments Clause in Article II of the U.S. 
Constitution.8   
This debate has overshadowed perhaps a more consequential, yet 
easily ignored, officer-appointment question: Will the future 
appointment of the Bureau’s Deputy Director—who under the Act 
can be assigned broad, undefined powers—comply with the 
Appointments Clause?  If not, years of litigation could undermine 
(and even invalidate) the Bureau’s work in which the Deputy 
Director participates.9 
The key facts concerning the Bureau and the Deputy Director’s 
appointment are as follows.  The Bureau will “regulate the offering 
and provision of consumer financial products or services under the 
Federal consumer financial laws.”10  The Bureau is “established in the 
Federal Reserve System,” an independent entity,11 as “an independent 
bureau.”12 Although “established in” the Federal Reserve, the Bureau 
has nearly complete autonomy from the Governors of the Federal 
                                                            
get the new CFPB started—right now.”); Jim Puzzanghera & Peter Nichols, Warren 
will mold finance watchdog; For now, Obama gives her an advisory role with the new agency, 
avoiding Senate fight, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2010, at AA1 (“Republicans would strongly 
oppose her nomination as permanent director.”); Alan Zibel & Maya Jackson 
Randall, Bank Group’s Chief Expects Warren’s Nomination Soon, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2011, 
3:00 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/05/02/bank-groups-chief-expects-
warrens-nomination-soon/ (noting that the president and chief executive of the 
Independent Community Bankers of America said that President Obama is likely to 
nominate Warren as the Bureau’s Director, despite likely opposition from Senate 
Republicans).    
 6. Dodd-Frank Act § 1011(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 
5491). 
 7. See Douglas S. Onley, Note, Treading on Sacred Ground:  Congress’s Power to 
Subject White House Advisers to Senate Confirmation, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1183, 1193–
94 (1996) (discussing the status and history of White House advisors); see also 3 
U.S.C. § 105(a)(1) (2006) (“[T]he President is authorized to appoint and fix the pay 
of employees in the White House Office . . . .”).  
 8. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Obama, Warren and the Imperial Presidency, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 22, 2010, at A21 (“During America’s first 150 years, Ms. Warren’s 
appointment as a special adviser to the White House would have been unthinkable.  
Today, it’s par for the course.”). 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. Dodd-Frank Act § 1011, 124 Stat. at 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491). 
 11. Id. §§ 1011–1012, at 1964–65 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491–92). 
 12. Id. § 1011(a), at 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491).  The Bureau also 
has an independent source of funding.  See id. § 1017, at 1975 (to be codified at 12 
U.S.C. 5497). 
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Reserve.13  Indeed, the Director of the Bureau heads the Bureau and 
has significant powers.14  One of those powers includes appointing 
the Deputy Director,15 an office that Dodd-Frank expressly 
establishes.16  The Act does not specify the Deputy Director’s duties, 
but it provides that he or she “shall . . . serve as acting Director in the 
absence or unavailability of the Director.”17   
Despite being logical and efficient, the Director’s appointment of 
the Deputy Director may violate the Appointments Clause.  That 
clause requires that, as relevant here and as considered in Part I, 
“Heads of Departments” appoint inferior officers like the Deputy 
Director.18  As Part II discusses, the Deputy Director almost certainly 
qualifies as an inferior officer whom a department head may appoint.  
Part III argues that the Director should qualify as a department head 
and thus should be able to appoint the Deputy Director.  Yet the 
Supreme Court’s recent 5-4 decision in Free Enterprise Fund19—decided 
only weeks before Dodd-Frank’s enactment—and the Court’s prior 
Appointments Clause jurisprudence provide a reasonable, and even 
likely, basis for holding otherwise.20  Part IV considers the 
ramifications of the Deputy Director’s potentially unconstitutional 
appointment and provides possible solutions.   
The Deputy Director’s appointment may at first seem 
inconsequential.  But she will likely be a powerful inferior officer, 
                                                            
 13. Id. § 1012(c)(2), at 1965 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5492) (“The Board of 
Governors may not⎯(A) intervene in any matter or proceeding before the Director, 
including examinations or enforcement actions, unless otherwise specifically 
provided by law; (B) appoint, direct, or remove any officer or employee of the 
Bureau; or (C) merge or consolidate the Bureau, or any of the functions or 
responsibilities of the Bureau, with any division or office of the Board or governors 
or the Federal reserve banks.”); id. § 1012(c)(3), at 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5492) (“No rule or order of the Bureau shall be subject to approval or review by the 
Board of Governors.  The Board of Governors may not delay or prevent the issuance 
of any rule or order of the Bureau.”).  Dodd-Frank establishes a Consumer Advisory 
Board to advise the Bureau on emerging practices in the consumer-financial-services 
industries.  Id. § 1014(a), at 1974 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5494).  Dodd-Frank 
also permits the Financial Stability Oversight Council—comprised of the 
chairpersons, directors, and secretaries of various federal agencies, including the 
Director of the Bureau, id. § 111(b), at 1392 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321)—to 
veto the Bureau’s regulations in certain instances, Dodd-Frank Act § 1023, 124 Stat. 
at 1985 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5513). 
 14. See, e.g., id. § 1012(a)–(b), at 1965 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5492) (listing 
Bureau’s powers and permitting Director to delegate authority); id. § 1022(b), at 
1980–81 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512) (providing significant rulemaking 
power).  
 15. Id. § 1011(b)(5)(A), at 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 19. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
 20. See infra notes 140–159 and accompanying text. 
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responsible for numerous important Bureau activities, especially if 
she assumes the Director’s duties.21  Her improper appointment 
could undermine those activities and significantly weaken, or at least 
unnecessarily distract, the Bureau during its administrative 
adolescence.22  To avoid unnecessary disruption, Congress should 
change how the Deputy Director is appointed when, as is likely, it 
reconsiders the Bureau’s powers.23 
I. THE APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS 
The Appointments Clause provides how “Officers of the United 
States” must be appointed.24  The Appointments Clause’s formal 
requirements are not mere “etiquette or protocol.”25  Instead, the 
Clause “prevent[s] the diffusion of the appointment power.”26  To 
that end, a principal officer may be appointed only if a majority of 
the Senate consents to the President’s nominee.27  Inferior officers 
may also be appointed in the same manner as principal officers.28  
Congress, however, in its discretion, can vest an inferior officer’s 
appointment “in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the 
Heads of Departments.”29  In contrast to federal “officers,” the 
Appointments Clause does not regulate the hiring of mere federal 
employees.30   
Two key issues surround the Deputy Director’s appointment.  First, 
is the Deputy Director a principal officer, an inferior officer, or 
merely an employee?31  Second, if the Deputy Director is an inferior 
officer, is the Bureau a department, and is the Bureau’s Director, 
accordingly, a department head?32   
                                                            
 21. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1012(a), 124 Stat. at 1965 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 
5492) (detailing the powers of the Bureau). 
 22. See infra Part IV. 
 23. See infra Part IV. 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 25. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 26. Id. (quoting Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991)); see also Evan J. 
Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 140 n.89 (2006) 
(citing The Federalist No. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)) 
(explaining that the Appointments Clause “provide[s] some practical security for 
each, against the invasion of the others”).  
 27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 
(1997). 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 29. Id.; Edmond, 520 U.S. at 660. 
 30. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162 (1976) (per curiam) (citing 
Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890); United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 
508, 510 (1878)). 
 31. See infra Part II. 
 32. See infra Part III. 
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II. THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR’S STATUS 
The Deputy Director is very likely an inferior officer.  Whether 
someone is an inferior officer depends on whether one’s “‘work is 
directed and supervised at some level’ by other officers appointed by 
the President with the Senate’s consent.”33  The Director almost 
certainly has the power to supervise her Deputy Director, instruct her 
on which policies to implement, oversee her job performance, and 
remove her.34  Thus, the Director’s supervisory power strongly 
suggests that the Deputy Director is an inferior officer. 
Whether or not the Director may remove the Deputy Director at 
will, the Deputy Director is still an inferior officer.35  The Supreme 
Court has indicated that an officer is very likely inferior if her 
supervising officer can remove her at will.36  But at-will removal is not 
a necessary condition for inferior-officer status if sufficient oversight 
exists.37  Indeed, the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson38 held that 
the independent prosecutor was an inferior officer despite the 
Attorney General’s ability to remove her only for good cause.39  
                                                            
 33. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162 (2010) (quoting Edmond, 
520 U.S. at 663). 
 34. The Director’s ability to remove the Deputy Director—even if governed by a 
good-cause standard—is very likely incident to her power to appoint.  See Myers v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119 (1926) (“This principle as a rule of constitutional 
statutory construction [that the power of removal is incident to the power of 
appointment], then generally conceded, has been recognized ever since.  The reason 
for this principle is that those in charge of and responsible for administering 
functions of government who select their executive subordinates need in meeting 
their responsibility to have power to remove those whom they appoint.” (citing In 
re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 259 (1839); Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419 
(1901); Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 315 (1903))); Burnap v. United 
States, 252 U.S. 512, 515 (1920) (“The power to remove is, in the absence of statutory 
provision to the contrary, an incident of the power to appoint.” (citing Hennen, 38 
U.S. (13 Pet.) at 259; Blake v. United States, 103 U.S. 227, 231 (1880); United States 
v. Allred, 155 U.S. 591, 594 (1895); Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 293–94 
(1900); Reagan, 182 U.S. at 426; Shurtleff, 189 U. S. at 316)); accord Carter v. Forrestal, 
175 F.2d 364, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (citing Myers, 272 U.S. at 47; Eberlein v. United 
States, 257 U.S. 82 (1921)).   
 35. Because whether the Director can remove the Deputy Director at will or only 
for cause does not affect the Deputy Director’s inferior-officer status, it is not 
necessary to determine whether the Deputy Director enjoys tenure protection.  I 
note, however, that 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2006)—which provides certain civil servants 
tenure protection—may apply to the Deputy Director.  Although at first blush the 
tenure-protection provision governing the civil service appears to reach only 
“employees,” it also reaches certain inferior “officers.”  See §§ 2101(1), 
2102(a)(1)(B), 2104, 7511(a). 
 36. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3162 (quoting Edmond, 520 U.S. at 664). 
 37. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988). 
 38. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 39. See id. at 671–72. 
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The Supreme Court has, at times, also considered the limited or 
expansive nature of an officer’s duties.40  For instance, in Morrison, the 
Court determined that an independent prosecutor was an inferior 
officer because she could be removed by a “higher Executive Branch 
official” and had limited, temporary jurisdiction and duties.41  In 
considering the nature of the duties, the Morrison Court relied 
primarily upon early Supreme Court decisions that distinguished 
officers from employees, not principal officers from inferior officers.42  
In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that an officer’s subordination (or 
lack thereof) to a principal officer, not the nature of her duties, 
should guide the Appointments Clause inquiry.43   
In Edmond v. United States,44 the Court, in an opinion written by 
Justice Scalia, adopted Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison.45  The 
Edmond Court held that the judges of the Coast Guard Court of 
Criminal Appeals were inferior officers.46  In reaching its decision, the 
Court held that the significance of an individual’s authority is 
relevant when determining whether the individual is either an officer 
or employee.47  Likewise, the presence or absence of subordination is 
relevant to whether an individual is an inferior or principal officer.48  
The Court distinguished Morrison on the ground that the Morrison 
Court did “not attempt . . . to decide exactly where the line falls 
between the two types of officers.”49  But the Supreme Court never 
explicitly disapproved Morrison’s Appointments Clause analysis.50 
                                                            
 40. See id. at 671–73; Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate But Equal?:  The Supreme Court, 
the Lower Federal Courts, and the Nature of the “Judicial Power”, 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 983–
84 (2000) (describing the debate as to whether “inferior” refers to an officer’s 
hierarchy or relative importance). 
 41. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671–72. 
 42. See Tuan Samahon, Are Bankruptcy Judges Unconstitutional?  An Appointments 
Clause Challenge, 60 HASTINGS L.J., 233, 256 & n.197 (2008) (noting the Court’s 
reliance on United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393 (1867), and United 
States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 512 (1878)).  The Morrison Court also relied on 
United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331 (1898).  In Eaton, the Court determined that a 
vice-consul’s temporary assumption of a consul’s duties did not render the vice-
consul a principal officer.  See id. at 336, 344.   
 43. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 719–21 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 44. 520 U.S. 651 (1997). 
 45. Id. at 662–64. 
 46. Id. at 666. 
 47. Id. at 662. 
 48. See id. at 662–63.  Justice Souter, in his concurring opinion, reiterated his 
view that the courts must consider both an officer’s subordination (or lack thereof) 
and the importance of the officer’s duties.  See id. at 667 (Souter, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment) (“Having a superior officer is necessary for 
inferior officer status, but not sufficient to establish it.”).  
 49. Id. at 661–62 (majority opinion). 
 50. Id. 
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The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Free Enterprise Fund follows 
Edmond’s lead and ignores Morrison.51  In Free Enterprise Fund, the 
Supreme Court held that the SEC Commissioners’ appointment of 
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (“PCAOB”) 
members was constitutional.52  The Court first determined that the 
SEC Commissioners, who are nominated by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate, had the ability to remove the PCAOB 
members at will.53  Given this plenary removal power and the SEC 
Commissioners’ other oversight powers, the Court had “no 
hesitation” in deeming the PCAOB members inferior officers.54  
Notably, the Court did not consider the extent of the PCAOB 
members’ powers in the portion of its opinion concerning the 
appointment power.  The Deputy Director’s powers may thus be 
irrelevant in determining her status.   
Yet, even if the Bureau’s and the Deputy Director’s powers over the 
financial industry are relevant to the Deputy Director’s status, these 
powers are unlikely to alter her status as an inferior officer.  The 
Court, in Free Enterprise Fund, had described PCAOB as having 
“expansive powers to govern an entire industry [i.e., auditors],”55 but 
these powers did not render the PCAOB members principal officers.  
As for the Bureau’s Deputy Director, she can expressly assume the 
Director’s duties if the Director is unavailable.56  And she can almost 
certainly assume other duties that the Director assigns.57  But, as Free 
Enterprise Fund indicates, the Deputy Director’s significant discretion 
over a large swath of the economy does not necessarily render her a 
principal officer.58   
                                                            
 51. See Samahon, supra note 42, at 258 (noting that Morrison’s precedential status 
was questionable after Edmond).  
 52. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162–63 (2010). 
 53. See id. at 3162. 
 54. Id. (“Given that the Commission is properly viewed, under the Constitution, 
as possessing the power to remove Board members at will, and given the 
Commission’s other oversight authority, we have no hesitation in concluding that 
under Edmond the Board members are inferior officers whose appointment Congress 
may permissibly vest in a ‘Hea[d] of Departmen[t].’”). 
 55. Id. at 3147. 
 56. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 1011(b)(5), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 
5491). 
 57. Id. § 1012(b), at 1965 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5492) (permitting the 
Director to delegate authority to “duly authorized employee[s], representative[s], or 
agent[s]”). 
 58. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147–48 (holding that despite their 
expansive power over the accounting industry, the board members of the PCAOB are 
inferior officers). 
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Likewise, the Deputy Director’s ability to assume the full powers of 
the Director (a principal officer) does not render her a principal 
officer.59  In United States v. Eaton,60 the Court held that a vice-consul 
charged with assuming a consul’s duties under “special and 
temporary conditions . . . is not thereby transformed into the 
superior and permanent official.”61  The Deputy’s ability to fill the 
Director’s shoes in certain scenarios, therefore, is not determinative. 
But the Deputy Director’s ability to assume the Director’s powers 
demonstrates that she is not merely an employee.  The Supreme 
Court has defined an “Officer of the United States” as “any appointee 
exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United 
States”62 and employees, in contrast, as “lesser functionaries 
subordinate to officers of the United States.”63  The significance of 
one’s authority “marks . . . the line between officer and nonofficer.”64  
Because district court clerks, thousands of clerks in the executive 
departments, an assistant surgeon, and even a cadet-engineer have all 
been deemed officers,65 it is extremely unlikely that the Deputy 
Director, with broad, unspecified powers that can shape and 
implement policy governing a large segment of the national 
                                                            
 59. Dodd-Frank Act § 1011(b)(5)(B), 124 Stat. at 1964 (to be codified at 12 
U.S.C. § 5491).  The Director is likely a principal officer because she can be removed 
only by the President.  See supra note 34 and accompanying text.  Although the 
Bureau rests within the Federal Reserve, the Governors cannot remove the Director; 
cannot intervene in proceedings before the Director; cannot appoint, direct, or 
remove Bureau officers or employees; cannot merge the Bureau’s functions; and 
cannot review or delay the Bureau’s rules.  See Dodd-Frank Act § 1012(c)(2)–(3), at 
1965-66 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5492).  The Financial Stability Oversight 
Council’s power to veto the Bureau’s rules by a two-thirds vote would not affect the 
Director’s principal status.  Id. § 1023(b)–(c), at 1985–86 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5513).  The Council would limit only one of the Bureau’s powers; the Council 
would not have the power to remove her.    
 60. 169 U.S. 331 (1898). 
 61. Id. at 343. 
 62. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam).  Moreover, the Deputy 
Director’s office, along with her method of appointment and certain restrictions on 
her activities, is established by statute.  See 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)–(d); Landry v. 
F.D.I.C., 204 F.3d 1125, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that administrative law judges are inferior 
officers, because among other reasons, their offices are “established by law”). 
 63. Id. at 126 n.162. 
 64. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662 (1997) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 
126). 
 65. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3179 (2010) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (citing In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 258 (1839) (district court 
clerks); United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511 (1878) (thousands of clerks in 
executive departments); United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 762 (1878) (an 
assistant-surgeon); United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 484 (1886) (a cadet-
engineer)). 
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economy,66 is an employee.  Indeed, the Court has indicated that 
even if certain of an individual’s duties are ministerial, the 
individual’s discretionary duties will control.67  In other words, an 
individual cannot be an employee when performing certain duties 
and an officer when performing other duties.  Given the Deputy 
Director’s ability to assume significant authority, including the 
Director’s powers, she is almost certainly more than a “lesser 
functionary” even if she will perform some ministerial, 
nondiscretionary tasks.  
III. THE BUREAU’S STATUS  
Because the Deputy Director is very likely an inferior officer, she 
must be appointed in one of the four methods under the 
Appointments Clause.68  Her appointment by the Director can only 
arguably constitute an appointment by the “Hea[d] of [a] 
Departmen[t].”69  Two Supreme Court cases are especially relevant 
when determining whether the Director heads a department: Freytag 
v. Commissioner70 and Free Enterprise Fund.  But these two cases (with a 
total of three relevant opinions) send numerous contradictory signals 
as to when an independent entity, such as the Bureau, constitutes a 
department. 
A. Freytag 
In Freytag, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision written by Justice 
Blackmun, ultimately held that the U.S. Tax Court was one of the 
“Courts of Law.”71  Thus, under the Appointments Clause, the Chief 
Judge of the Tax Court could appoint special trial judges, who were 
                                                            
 66. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1012(a), 124 Stat. at 1965 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.  
§ 5492) (listing the broad powers of the Bureau).    
 67. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991) (“Special trial judges are 
not inferior officers for purposes of some of their duties . . . , but mere employees 
with respect to other responsibilities.  The fact that an inferior officer on occasion 
performs duties that may be performed by an employee not subject to the 
Appointments Clause does not transform his status under the Constitution.  If a 
special trial judge is an inferior officer for purposes of [certain statutory 
subsections], he is an inferior officer within the meaning of the Appointments 
Clause and he must be properly appointed.”). 
 68. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; cf. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881 (holding that special 
trial judges of the U.S. Tax Court are inferior officers and therefore must be 
appointed under the Appointments Clause). 
 69. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163–64 (discussing the definition of 
“Hea[d] of [a] Departmen[t]”). 
 70. 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
 71. Id. at 890–92. 
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inferior officers.72  But before turning to the “Courts of Law” 
provision, the majority held that the U.S. Tax Court was not a 
department.73   
The Court identified the purpose of the Appointments Clause: to 
mitigate the “manipulation of official appointments.”74  Treating each 
administrative organ as a department (as the government had 
argued), and thus distributing the appointment power to every organ 
within the executive branch, would have undermined the “Framers’ 
conclusion that widely distributed appointment power subverts 
democratic government.”75  Accordingly, the Court reasoned that the 
Constitution intends only a limited set of executive entities to qualify 
as departments.76 
To define “departments,” the Court turned to its prior decisions.77  
Two of those decisions had limited departments to entities that 
Congress had “expressly creat[ed] and giv[en] . . . the name of a 
department.”78  In one of those prior decisions, United States v. 
Germaine,79 the Supreme Court read the Appointments Clause in 
conjunction with the Opinion Clause of Article II.80  That clause 
permits the President to “require the Opinion, in writing, of the 
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments.”81  In 
Germaine, the Court limited “Executive Departments” in the Opinion 
Clause (and thus “Departments” in the Appointments Clause) to 
those departments headed by cabinet members.  Because 
“Departments” had to be headed by a cabinet member, “inferior 
commissioners and bureau officers” would not qualify as “Heads of 
Departments.”82  Although the Freytag majority expanded Germaine’s 
definition of “department” by including “executive divisions like the 
Cabinet-level departments,”83 the majority otherwise accepted 
                                                            
 72. Id. at 882–83.  The “Excepting Clause” to the Appointments Clause provides 
that “the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as 
they [i.e., Congress] think proper, . . . in the Courts of Law.”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, 
cl. 2. 
 73. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 885–86. 
 74. Id. at 883 (quoting GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
1776–1787 79, 143 (1969)). 
 75. Id. at 885. 
 76. Id. at 886. 
 77. See id.; United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510–11 (1878).   
 78. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 886 (citing Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 515 
(1920); Germaine, 99 U.S. at 510–11).   
 79. 99 U.S. 508 (1878). 
 80. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 886 (citing Burnap, 252 U.S. at 515; Germaine, 99 U.S. at 
510–11). 
 81. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 82. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 886 (quoting Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511). 
 83. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Germaine’s cabinet-level distinction because “Cabinet-level 
departments are limited in number and easily identified.”84  Despite 
rejecting the argument that the Tax Court was a department, the 
majority reserved the question of whether a “principal agency” that is 
not a cabinet-level department, such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”), was a department.85   
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the four concurring justices in 
Freytag concluded that the U.S. Tax Court and the SEC—despite the 
latter’s independent status—were departments.86  These 
establishments were departments because they were “free-standing, 
self-contained entit[ies] in the Executive Branch.”87  Justice Scalia 
took issue with the majority’s understanding that the Appointments 
Clause was meant to limit the Executive Branch’s power.88  He argued 
that the Appointments Clause deposited the appointment power in 
the executive branch as a reaction to the “division and faction” that 
legislative appointments of executive officers had caused in state 
governments.89  Granting the legislature the power to appoint would 
have led less-accountable legislators to appoint, and even create 
offices for, friends and patrons.90  
Not only did the majority misunderstand the purpose of the 
Appointments Clause in the concurring justices’ view, but nothing 
limited departments to “cabinet-level” agencies.  Neither Congress 
nor the Constitution, as a preliminary matter, decides whether 
certain officers are members of the cabinet.91  Yet, putting this 
indefiniteness of “cabinet members” aside, limiting departments to 
cabinet-level agencies means that the appointment of many inferior 
                                                            
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 887 n.4. 
 86. The concurring justices rejected the majority’s conclusion that the U.S. Tax 
Court was a “Court[] of law.”  They argued that the “Courts of law” referred only to 
Article III courts.  See id. at 901–02 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment). 
 87. See id. at 914–15 (arguing that the Chief Judge of the U.S. Tax Court is a 
department head). 
 88. Id. at 904 n.4. 
 89. Id. (quoting WOOD, supra note 74, at 407). 
 90. Id.  The concurring justices stated that “[t]he Appointments Clause is, 
intentionally and self-evidently, a limitation on Congress.”  Id.  Yet, it hardly seems 
self-evident that a Clause that limits the President’s ability to appoint principal and, in 
most instances, inferior officers was meant to limit only Congress.  Instead, by seeking 
to limit the power of any single branch to appoint officers, the Clause is best read to 
limit both Congress and the President.  Cf. Henry Monaghan, The Protective Power of 
the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17 n.76 (1993) (“Justice Scalia’s assertion that 
‘[t]he Appointments Clause is, intentionally and self-evidently, a limitation on 
Congress’ is misleading oversimplification.”). 
 91. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 917–18 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in judgment). 
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officers in independent agencies would be invalid because the heads 
of these independent agencies, not cabinet-level principal officers, 
typically appoint them.92  The concurring justices argued that the 
Appointments Clause permitted principal officers—whether or not 
part of the cabinet—to appoint their subordinate officers.93  It follows 
from this understanding that “the term ‘Departments’ means all 
independent executive establishments.”94 
B. Free Enterprise Fund 
Almost twenty years later in Free Enterprise Fund the Court 
considered the reserved question of the SEC’s status.  The plaintiffs 
argued that the SEC was not a department and thus that the SEC 
Commissioners could not, as permitted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
appoint the members of PCAOB.95  Free Enterprise Fund adopted the 
reasoning of the four concurring justices in Freytag and held that the 
SEC was a department.96  The Court noted that the nation’s Founders 
understood a department to be a “separate allotment or part of 
business; a distinct province, in which a class of duties are [sic] 
allotted to a particular person.”97  Indeed, Congress, in 1792, had 
permitted the Postmaster General to appoint inferior officers, even 
though he was not a “Secretary” or a cabinet-level official.98  With 
Congress’s early practice in mind, the Court held that the SEC was a 
department under the Appointments Clause because it is “a free-
                                                            
 92. See id. at 918. 
 93. See id. at 919 (“If the Appointments Clause is read as I read it, all inferior 
officers can be made appointable by their ultimate (sub-Presidential) superiors 
. . . .”); id. at 918 (“A number of factors support the proposition that ‘Heads of 
Departments’ includes the heads of all agencies immediately below the President in 
the organizational structure of the Executive Branch.”); id. at 920 (“[The 
Constitution’s use of the word ‘department’ may seem strange] only because the 
Founders did not envision that an independent establishment of such small size and 
specialized function would be created.”); id. (“Principal officers could be permitted 
by law to appoint their subordinates.”). 
 94. See 26 U.S.C. § 7443(f) (2006) (“Judges of the Tax Court may be removed by 
the President, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, for inefficiency, 
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause.”); Freytag, 501 U.S. 
at 919 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 95. See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162 (2010) (“But, 
petitioners argue, the Commission is not a ‘Departmen[t]’ like the ‘Executive 
departments’ (e.g., State, Treasury, Defense) listed in 5 U.S.C. § 101.”); see also  
15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(4) (permitting the SEC Commissioners to appoint PCAOB 
members). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. (quoting 1 N. WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(1828) (def. 2) (1995 facsimile ed.)). 
 98. Id. at 3163. 
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standing component of the Executive Branch, not subordinate to or 
contained within any other component.”99   
The Court’s decision was not as clear as it may seem.  The Court, 
perhaps importantly, did not simply state that the SEC qualified 
because it was a “free-standing, self-contained entity,” as the Freytag 
concurring justices would have had it in one portion of their 
opinion.100  Likewise, the Court did not say that the SEC was a 
department only because it was an “independent executive 
establishment[],” as the Freytag concurring justices would have had it 
in another portion of their opinion.101  Instead, the Court considered 
both independence and noncontainment, without clarifying whether 
each characteristic was a necessary condition for an entity to 
constitute a department.102  Free Enterprise Fund also failed to clarify 
exactly which reasoning in the Freytag concurring opinion it adopted 
and which portion, if any, of the majority opinion in Freytag remains 
good law.103  These ambiguities affect the Bureau and other similarly 
situated entities. 
C. Freytag, Free Enterprise Fund, and the Consumer Bureau 
Congress created the Bureau’s administrative structure while Free 
Enterprise Fund was submitted to the Supreme Court for decision.104  
The Bureau is an exotic, but not an entirely unique, administrative 
creature.105  It is an independent establishment that rests within—yet 
is not accountable to—another independent establishment.106   
                                                            
 99. Id.  But see Gary Lawson, The “Principal” Reason Why the PCAOB Is 
Unconstitutional, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 73, 82 (2009) (“I would state the ultimate 
test for departmental status as follows:  a unit of the federal executive is a 
constitutional ‘Department[]’ under the Appointments Clause if it has sufficient 
organizational identity and decisional authority to be a constitutional ‘Department[]’ 
under the Appointments Clause.  If that sounds absurdly circular to you, then you 
are half-right: it is circular, but not absurdly so.”).  Professor Lawson argued, prior to 
the Court’s decision in Free Enterprise Fund, that PCAOB itself qualified as a 
“department” and that its members were principal officers.  See id. at 75. 
 100. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 915 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). 
 101. Id. at 919. 
 102. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163. 
 103. See id. at 3162–63 (discussing the Freytag opinion without clarifying upon 
which part the Court relies). 
 104. Free Enterprise Fund was argued on December 7, 2009, and the court issued its 
decision on June 28, 2010, only three weeks before the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted 
on July 21, 2010.  Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3138; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 
(2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301). 
 105. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is a similarly independent entity 
within the purview of the Department of Energy.  See infra note 112 and 
accompanying text. 
 106. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
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I have uncovered nothing in the legislative history directly 
revealing why Congress decided to house the Bureau within the 
Federal Reserve.107  Perhaps Congress did so as an illusory concession 
to Republicans who opposed “the Obama administration’s original 
aim of creating a stand-alone Consumer Financial Protection 
Agency . . . .”108  Instead, Republicans sought to place “consumer 
protection powers with [bank] regulators.”109  Senate Democrats, by 
ultimately placing the Bureau within the Federal Reserve, may have 
desired to give the appearance that the Bureau was part of the federal 
bank-regulatory apparatus.  But by giving the Federal Reserve 
essentially no powers over the Bureau,110 Senate Democrats continued 
to propose an independent agency—albeit one that was not free-
standing.111  Another possibility is that the Senate sought to model the 
Bureau on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), an 
“independent regulatory commission” that is “established within” the 
Department of Energy.112 
                                                            
 107. The Senate’s bill created the Bureau in its present form.  See S. Rep. No. 111-
176, at 11 (2010) (explaining the need for the Bureau to protect consumers by 
regulating bank practices, but failing to explain the rationale for housing it inside 
the Federal Reserve).  Although dissenting senators complained that the Bureau was 
“a massive new entity whose power and autonomy have no current equivalent 
anywhere else in the Federal government,” they did not appear to consider other 
structural alternatives for the Bureau.  See id. at 246–47 (criticizing the Bureau’s 
ineffectiveness at regulating failing banks, without proposing an alternative). 
 108. Silla Brush, GOPs Oppose Proposal for Consumer Bureau at Treasury Department, 
THE HILL (Feb. 27, 2010 9:30 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/84083-
gops-oppose-proposal-for-consumer-agency-at-treasury-dept (emphasis added). 
 109. Id.  
 110. See supra note 13. 
 111. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies:  Avoiding Capture Through 
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 73 (2010) (citing Sewell Chan, Dodd Proposes 
Giving Fed the Task of Consumer Protection, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2010, at B2 
(“[A]dvocates, mindful of fierce Republican opposition to a stand-alone agency, have 
said that they are less concerned about where the entity is housed than the scope of 
its authority and the independence of its leadership and budget.”)) (noting that the 
Mortgage Bankers Association, the Chairman of the FDIC, and congressional 
Republicans, among others, “ultimately pushed the Administration to give up on a 
free-standing agency”).   
 112. 42 U.S.C. § 7171(a) (2006).  FERC officials are similarly independent from 
the Department of Energy as the Bureau officials are from the Governors of the 
Federal Reserve.  Id. § 7171(d) (“In the performance of their functions, the 
members, employees, or other personnel of the Commission shall not be responsible 
to or subject to the supervision or direction of any officer, employee, or agent of any 
other part of the Department.”).  Unlike the Bureau, however, FERC is not led by a 
single director.  Instead, it is led by a five-member commission.  Id. § 7171(b)(1); see 
Jay S. Bybee, Agency Expertise, ALJ Independence, and Administrative Courts:  The Recent 
Changes in Louisiana’s Administrative Procedure Act, 59 LA. L. REV. 431, 439 (1999) 
(referring to independent agencies led by a single individual as the “strangest 
[administrative] animals yet”). 
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Regardless of why Congress structured the Bureau as it did, its 
placement within the Federal Reserve may deprive the Bureau of 
departmental status.113  Assuming that the Bureau has a distinct 
province,114 the Bureau may not satisfy the Court’s other 
requirements, viz., that the Bureau not be subordinate to or 
contained within any other free-standing component of the Executive 
Branch.115  Free Enterprise Fund does not clarify whether both, or only 
one, of these criteria must exist for the Bureau to qualify as a 
department.  The Bureau is not subordinate to the Federal Reserve 
System because the Governors cannot appoint, direct, or remove the 
Bureau’s employees or officers, and the Governors cannot merge or 
consolidate the Bureau with the Federal Reverse divisions or banks.116  
But the Bureau is “contained within” the Federal Reserve System, 
itself an independent, free-standing component of the Executive 
Branch.117  If, on one hand, a department must be both independent 
and self-contained, the Bureau is not a department.118  But if, on the 
                                                            
 113. The House of Representatives’ proposal created a Consumer Financial 
Protection Commission that, much like the SEC, would have been a free-standing, 
independent agency led by five commissioners appointed by the President with the 
Senate’s advice and consent.  See Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, 
H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. §§ 111–12 (2009) (establishing the Consumer Protection 
Agency).  A Consumer Financial Protection Oversight Board, made of various federal 
officers, would have advised the Commission.  Id. §§ 112–13.  This administrative 
structure likely would not have posed an Appointments Clause question.   
 114. The Bureau’s significant and independent role in regulating consumer-
financial products likely provides the Bureau “a distinct province, in which a class of 
duties [is] allotted to a particular person.”  Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 
3138, 3162–63 (2010).  Nevertheless, as the statute creating the Bureau recognizes, 
the SEC, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, the FTC, and other federal 
establishments also regulate consumer-financial products.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1015, 124 Stat. 1376, 
1974 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5495).  Thus, whether the Bureau has a 
“distinct province” with a particularized “class of duties” is not free from doubt.  Cf. 
Barkow, supra note 111, at 55–56 (noting how, to prevent agency capture and to 
ensure enforcement of regulatory or statutory mandates, Congress often provides 
more than one agency power over regulated industries). 
 115. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163. 
 116. Dodd-Frank Act § 1012(c)(2), 124 Stat. at 1965–66 (to be codified at  
12 U.S.C. § 5492).  The Financial Stability Oversight Council, however, can reject the 
Bureau’s regulations by a two-thirds vote.  Id. § 1023(c)(3), at 1985–86 (to be 
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5513).  Although this veto power limits one of the Bureau’s 
powers, I doubt that this limitation alone would deprive the Bureau of its 
independent status.  Not only is the Council’s authority circumscribed, but it is far 
from certain that the Council would qualify as a “component of the Executive 
Branch” to which the Bureau would be subordinate.  Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 
3163. 
 117. See Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 12 U.S.C. § 222 (2006).  
 118. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163. 
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other hand, a department may be either independent or self-
contained, then the Bureau is more likely a department.119   
1. The normative view 
In my view, the Board’s independence from other executive 
components alone should render it a department.  The Freytag 
concurring opinion strongly suggests that a putative department 
head’s independence from other principal officers should control 
her status.120  That opinion proposed that “all inferior officers can be 
made appointable by their ultimate (sub-Presidential) superiors.”121  
That proposal makes sense.  The superior officer is the one who must 
supervise and rely upon the inferior officer.  Permitting all superior 
officers to appoint their inferior officers prevents the anomalous 
result of requiring Congress, if it chooses a departmental 
appointment, to bestow the appointment power upon an unrelated 
department head.122  In the Deputy Director’s case, the Director is a 
properly appointed principal officer who is not subordinate to any 
other executive officer and, thus, should be able to appoint her 
deputy.123  The executive entity’s subordination, or the lack thereof, 
to another executive component should be the guidepost.124  
                                                            
 119. Id.  There may be one additional permissible reading of Free Enterprise Fund.  
Perhaps the standard (“not subordinate to or contained within any other . . . 
component”) merely seeks to use “contained within” as an appositive for 
“subordinate to.”  Id.  If this were so, agency independence would be the guiding 
criterion and permit the Director to be a department head.  But if this were the 
intended meaning, the Court’s language created ambiguity where none even 
arguably existed.  Such an interpretation would also likely be contrary to a portion of 
the Freytag concurrence, which conceded that the now-defunct Board of Tax Appeals 
(an independent agency) would not have qualified as a department because it was a 
subdivision of the Treasury Department.  See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 915 
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see also infra notes 
144–151 and accompanying text. 
 120. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 919 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment) (“This evident meaning—that the term ‘Departments’ means all 
independent executive establishments—is also the only construction that makes 
sense of [the] sharp distinction between principal officers and inferior officers.”). 
 121. Id.  This understanding is also consistent with United States v. Germaine.  The 
Germaine Court stated that “heads of departments” were not “inferior commissioners 
and bureau officers, who are themselves the mere aids and subordinates of the heads 
of the departments.”  99 U.S. 508, 511 (1878).  Even when the Germaine Court 
considered bureaus and commissions, its inquiry focused on those entities’ 
subordination or lack thereof.  Id. 
 122. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 919 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment) (explaining that an interpretation requiring all inferior officers whose 
superiors are not Cabinet members to be appointed by the President is an 
“implausible” result).  
 123. Scholars and the Supreme Court have reasoned that, at the very least, all 
principal officers are heads of departments, even if not all heads of departments are 
principal officers.  Compare Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the 
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 37 (1994) (arguing that principal executive 
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Refusing to treat the Bureau as a department merely because it is 
housed within another establishment (and thus not self-contained) is 
unjustifiable formalism.125  The Bureau has a specific sphere of duties 
in which the encasing establishment (the Federal Reserve) cannot 
intervene.126  In other words, Congress has provided the Bureau a 
                                                            
officers may be merely a subset of department heads), and Kimberly N. Brown, 
Presidential Control of the Elite “Non-Agency”, 88 N.C. L. REV. 71, 90–91 n.128 (2009) 
(same), with Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511 (comparing the use of principal officers and 
departments in the Opinions Clause to their use in the Appointments Clause and 
stating that “the principal officer in the one case is the equivalent of the head of the 
department in the other”), and Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash,  
The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 635 (1994) (“[T]he 
interchangeable use of numerous terms for officers we today call Secretaries 
indicates that ‘principal officers in the Executive Departments’ and ‘Heads of 
Departments’ are one and the same.”).  Yet, if the Director is a principal officer 
(because she is subordinate to only the President) but not a department head as  
Free Enterprise Fund suggests, then these scholars and the Germaine Court were 
incorrect.   Some principal officers, such as the Director, would not be heads of 
departments.  Cf. United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 337–45 (1898) (referring to 
consuls as “principal officer[s]” and “principal officials,” although consuls are not 
likely heads of departments because the Secretary of State would be the relevant 
head of department). 
 124. As an aside, the meaning of “independence” in the separation-of-powers 
context does not have a uniform meaning.  The meaning changes as one addresses 
the Appointments Clause, the President’s removal power, or practical administrative 
hegemony.  Independence (or nonsubordination) in the context of the 
Appointments Clause and an officer’s status likely refers to whether the appointing 
officer can be removed only by the President, as opposed to any other executive 
officers.  See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also Free Enter. Fund v. 
PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162 (2010) (“‘[I]nferior officers’ are officers whose work is 
directed and supervised at some level’ by other officers appointed by the President 
with the Senate’s consent.”) (quoting Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–63 
(1997)).  But in the removal-power context, independence is likely tied to the ability 
of the President or other supervising officer to remove a subordinate officer for only 
certain causes.  See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3157–58.  This form of independence 
is what shapes the traditional understanding of “independent agency.”  See Free 
Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 537 F.3d 667, 701 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting) (“[Independent agency] is the term that traditionally has been applied 
by the Supreme Court, the Congress, and the Executive Branch to agencies like the 
PCAOB whose heads are not removable at will.”).  But if these differences were not 
enough, Professor Barkow correctly argues that the indicia of true administrative 
independence is a function of, among other things, tenure protection, budgetary 
control, the ability to obtain politically useful information, and protection from 
interference and competition from other federal and state agencies.  See Barkow, 
supra note 111, at 18; cf. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3156–57 (strongly implying that 
practical indicia of independence or control are not relevant to separation-of-powers 
concerns because it deemed the power to remove as necessary for the President to 
have sufficient control over executive officers). 
 125. Although a formal inquiry may be suitable when the Constitution’s text 
compels it (e.g., according to the Appointments Clause, the House cannot appoint 
executive officers even if it makes sense for the House to do so in a particular 
instance, see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2), nothing in the constitutional text compels 
a department to be both independent and self-contained.  Requiring an 
independent entity to be self-contained creates an unnecessary, formal distinction 
devoid of meaning. 
 126. See supra note 13. 
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condominium within the Federal Reserve complex, but the Bureau is 
not beholden to the Federal Reserve merely because they share 
walls.127  Requiring Congress to create stand-alone bureaus would be a 
purely formal gesture that lacks constitutional compulsion and does 
not change the substance of the Bureau’s powers, affect any potential 
appointment-power dilution, or otherwise alter the Director’s power, 
status, or appointment.128 
 Indeed, if self-containment were required, certain independent 
agencies would be denied departmental status merely because they 
are “established in” another executive component, despite their 
similarity to certain “departments.”129  For instance, both the Bureau 
and FERC would satisfy the nonsubordination criterion yet fail the 
self-containment criterion because they are “established in” another 
executive component.130  But other independent agencies, such as the 
National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”)131 and the Social 
Security Administration (“SSA”),132 with independent powers similar 
(if not more limited) in breadth to the Bureau and the FERC’s, 
would be deemed departments merely because their organic acts do 
not expressly place them within another executive component133 
(such as the Departments of Transportation or Health and Human 
Services, respectively).  It is hard to fathom why the Free Enterprise 
Fund Court would have sought to deny departmental status to 
powerful agencies like FERC, but grant it to the NTSB and the SSA.134  
                                                            
 127. See supra note 13; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011(e), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964–65 (2010) (to be codified at 
12 U.S.C. § 5491) (establishing the Bureau’s offices inside the Federal Reserve in 
Washington, D.C.). 
 128. The constitutionality of other deputy appointments may be doubtful, 
especially deputies within nonindependent bureaus and offices.  See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. 
§ 6704(b) (2006) (permitting Chief of the Forest Service to appoint Deputy Chief for 
International Forestry).  For these deputies, the Court’s precedents, as well as the 
opinions of individual justices, strongly suggest that these appointments are not 
constitutional if the deputies are “inferior officers.”  See infra notes 146–147.  Notably, 
Congress often permits the President or a department head to appoint deputies.  See, 
e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1462a(c)(5) (2006) (permitting Secretary of the Treasury, not 
Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, to appoint Office’s deputies); 6 U.S.C. 
§ 321c(a) (permitting President, with Senate’s advice and consent, to appoint FEMA 
deputies); 5 U.S.C. § 1102(b) (permitting President, with Senate’s advice and 
consent, to appoint the Deputy Director of the Office of Personnel Management). 
 129. See supra notes 11, 112 and accompanying text. 
 130. See supra notes 11, 112 and accompanying text. 
 131. See 49 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (“The [NTSB] is an independent establishment of the 
United States Government.”). 
 132. See 42 U.S.C. § 901(a) (“There is hereby established, as an independent 
agency in the executive branch of the Government, a [SSA] . . . .”). 
 133. See supra notes 131–132 and accompanying text. 
 134. Justice Breyer’s dissent in Free Enterprise Fund, joined by three other justices, 
suggests that the FERC (and thus the Bureau) would qualify as a “department.”  In 
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Moreover, even if the Court were to treat in the same manner express 
and implied statutory establishment of an agency within another 
executive component, many administrative establishments (such as 
the NTSB and the SSA) would likely lose departmental status—
thereby creating even more difficulties for ensuring that principal 
officers can appoint their subordinates. 
Finally, that Congress creates more principal officers by creating 
additional independent establishments does not, despite the Freytag 
majority’s concern, dilute the appointment power.135  The 
government’s business—whether rightly or wrongly—is growing as 
more officers are needed to provide increased regulation and 
enforcement.136  When creating the Bureau with its new regulatory 
and enforcement powers, Congress did not leave the size of 
government static while increasing the number of appointing 
officers.137  Instead, the number of appointing officers grew with the 
government’s business.138  Ultimately, permitting the Director to 
appoint her Deputy Director merely allows a principal officer to be 
clearly responsible for the Deputy Director’s actions without 
improper appointing-power diffusion.139  
2. The contrary view  
Despite the compelling reasons for deeming the independent 
Bureau a department, the Freytag and Free Enterprise Fund opinions can 
be read to require both independence and self-containment.140  
                                                            
his appendix, he lists “24 stand-alone federal agencies (i.e., ‘departments’) whose 
heads are, by statute, removable by the President only ‘for cause.’”   Free Enter. Fund 
v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3184 app. A (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  One of those 
“stand-alone federal agencies (i.e., ‘departments’)” is the FERC.  Id. at 3186 app. A.  
He also lists the NTSB and the SSA.  See id. at 3187–88 app. A.  The dissent does not 
define “stand-alone” (i.e., does it refer to independence? self-containment? a 
combination of both?  something else?). 
 135. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 885 (1991) (“The [Appointments] 
Clause reflects our Framers’ conclusion that widely distributed appointment power 
subverts democratic government.”). 
 136. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3155 (“No one doubts Congress’s power to 
create a vast and varied federal bureaucracy,”). 
 137. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 1013(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1966–67 (2010) (to be codified at 12 
U.S.C. § 5493) (giving the Director broad discretion to decide how many employees 
to employ and in what capacity). 
 138. Id. 
 139. John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 904, 915 (2009) (“The Appointments Clause is designed to prevent the 
diffusion of appointment power precisely so that the individual with primary 
responsibility for a governmental department is both at a high level (subordinate 
only to the President) and readily identifiable.”). 
 140. See infra notes 142–154 and accompanying text. 
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Those opinions suggest that “department” should have a 
circumscribed meaning and thus apply only to self-contained 
entities.141  Moreover, reading Free Enterprise Fund’s two criteria in the 
disjunctive may lead to untenable results in other, albeit hypothetical, 
scenarios. 
The majority in Freytag held that its limited understanding of 
department was consistent with the purpose of the Appointments 
Clause to “prevent[] Congress from distributing power too widely by 
limiting the actors in whom Congress may vest the power to 
appoint . . . [and thereby] subvert[] democratic government.”142  
Perhaps regardless of whether federal business grows or remains 
static, the Court feared that “holding that every organ in the 
Executive Branch is a department would multiply indefinitely the 
number of actors eligible to appoint.”143   
Even the concurring justices in Freytag suggested that a department 
must be self-contained.144  They referred to the Tax Court as “a free-
standing, self-contained entity” when deciding its departmental 
status145 and noted that the Court had in other decisions held that 
bureaus within traditional executive agencies were not 
departments.146  In fact, the concurring justices conceded that the 
former Board of Tax Appeals, as a former subdivision of the Treasury 
Department, could not qualify as a department.147  The Board, like 
the Tax Court, was an “independent agency.”148  The distinguishing 
feature between the Tax Court and the Board of Tax Appeals was self-
                                                            
 141. See supra notes 74–76, 99 and accompanying text. 
 142. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 885 (1991). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 915 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 917 (referring to Germaine’s holding that the Commissioner of 
Pensions, an official within the Interior Department, was not a head of a 
department); Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 514–15 (1920) (indicating—
although Justice Scalia says holding—that the Bureau of Public Buildings and 
Grounds, a bureau within the War Department, was not a department)). 
 147. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 915 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment) (“If, for instance, the Tax Court were a subdivision of the Department of 
the Treasury—as the Board of Tax Appeals used to be—it would not qualify [as a 
department].  In fact, however, the Tax Court is a free-standing, self-contained entity 
in the Executive Branch, whose Chief Judge is removable by the President (and, save 
impeachment, no one else).”). 
 148. See Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, 43 Stat. 253, 337 (“Any member 
of the Board may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office, but for no other reason.”); id. at 338 (“The Board shall be an 
independent agency in the executive branch of the Government.”); Freytag, 501 U.S. 
at 885, 891. 
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containment; the former was self-contained and thus a department,149 
while the latter was not.150  And finally the Free Enterprise Fund Court 
did not simply conclude that all independent establishments or 
“agencies” were departments, despite the ease with which it could 
have done so.151 
The Freytag concurring opinion, moreover, may ultimately reject 
the functional concerns that support my normative determination.  
The concurring justices suggested that the Court should not create 
distinct separation-of-powers jurisprudence for independent, as 
opposed to traditionally executive, agencies based on their 
independence alone.152  My conclusion, however, requires that 
independent bureaus and offices be deemed departments when they 
rest within other establishments, although nonindependent executive 
offices and bureaus would not be deemed departments.153  Formal 
notions of self-containment, accordingly, may trump functionalism 
and even common-sense concerns no matter which Freytag opinion 
governs.154   
Finally, considering the two criteria in the disjunctive may lead to 
questionable results.  For instance, assume that a hypothetical 
executive establishment, contrary to the Bureau, is subordinate to 
another executive establishment but self-contained.  Under the 
disjunctive theory, the self-contained, subordinate executive 
establishment would be a department even though the department 
head would likely be an inferior officer since he is subordinate to 
another executive establishment.155  The Court has never suggested 
that inferior officers can be department heads.156  Indeed, such an 
                                                            
 149. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 915 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment). 
 150. Id. 
 151. See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162–63 (2010). 
 152. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3176 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court 
should not create a separate constitutional jurisprudence for the ‘independent 
agencies.’”); Freytag, 501 U.S. at 921 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment) (“[A]djusting the remainder of the Constitution to compensate for [this 
distinction] is a fruitless endeavor.”); see also id. at 886 (majority opinion) (“[T]he 
term ‘Heads of Departments’ does not embrace ‘inferior commissioners and bureau 
officers.’” (quoting United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511 (1878))); Burnap v. 
United States, 252 U.S. 512, 515 (1920) (stating the principle enunciated in Germaine 
more broadly because the Court failed to refer to inferiority or independence when 
stating that “department” “does not include heads of bureaus or lesser divisions”).  
 153. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.  
 154. See supra notes 3–23, 127–128, 140–153 and accompanying text.  
 155. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (setting out the definition of an 
inferior officer as one who is subordinate to an officer appointed by the President). 
 156. See Lawson, supra note 99, at 80–81 (“There is nothing logically impossible 
about vesting the appointment of inferior officers in other inferior officers, but it 
certainly looks odd given the phrasing of the Appointments Clause.”). 
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interpretation would permit Congress to expand the “Heads of 
Departments” significantly by relying on a nonsubstantive, formal 
criterion.157  That interpretation would offend the Freytag majority 
opinion’s concern over appointment-power dilution.158  Treating both 
criteria as necessary conditions precludes this odd result. 
Given the ambiguity in the Court’s decisions and uncertainty as to 
which portions of Freytag are good law, a significant constitutional 
question exists as to whether the Bureau is a department, and thus 
whether the Director is a department head who can appoint the 
Deputy Director.159  
IV. AVOIDING THE SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION 
Depending upon the Deputy Director’s duties and the judicial 
remedies for an unconstitutional appointment, a decision holding 
that the Deputy Director’s appointment is unconstitutional could be 
debilitating to the Bureau.160  Admittedly, we cannot know the 
consequences of an improper appointment until we learn which 
powers the Deputy Director will assume.  Yet, most matters in which 
the Deputy Director may participate—such as rulemaking, 
adjudicatory matters, and enforcement proceedings—would likely be 
called into question and perhaps even invalidated.161  Indeed, when 
                                                            
 157. See supra note 142–143 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 159. If the Director is not a department head, the Bureau could not rely upon the 
“approbation rule,” which permits a department head to approve a subordinate’s 
appointment of an inferior officer.  That rule applies to situations in which the 
statute expressly requires the department head to approve the appointment.   
See United States v. Smith, 124 U.S. 525, 532–33 (1888); United States v. Hartwell,  
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393–94 (1868).  First, the Bureau’s situation would differ 
because it may not qualify as a “department” in the first instance and thus have no 
head to approbate the decision.  Second, even if the President or another 
department head attempted to approbate the Deputy Director’s appointment, that 
approbation would encounter statutory difficulties because Dodd-Frank gives the 
Director, not the President or another department head, the power to appoint the 
Deputy Director.  The statute does not give the President or other department head 
the power to approbate the appointment.  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011(b)(5)(A), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 
(2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491); Smith, 124 U.S. at 533 (rejecting the 
argument that a head of department’s approval is relevant if no law expressly gives 
the department head the power to approve); see also United States v. Mourat, 124 
U.S. 303, 308 (1888) (noting that a certain clerk was not an officer because, among 
other reasons, there was no act that required a head of department to approve an 
appointment). 
 160. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137–38 (1976) (per curiam) 
(invalidating several “executive” powers of the FEC after the commissioners’ 
appointment was deemed unconstitutional).   
 161. Id. But the remedy for any violation is far from clear.  Most (of the few) 
Appointments Clause challenges arise when an officer seeks a principal officer’s 
salary or when courts must decide whether an individual was a federal “officer” 
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invalidating the appointment of the Federal Election Commissioners 
in Buckley v. Valeo,162 the Court invalidated all of the agency’s powers 
that were executive in nature.163  Thus, the Deputy Director’s 
unconstitutional appointment will, at the very least, likely deprive her 
of prospective executive power.164 
Although the Buckley Court provided the FEC Commissioners’ past 
executive actions “de facto” validity,165 the Court later suggested that 
the remedy in Buckley had limited future application.166  The Court’s 
de-facto-validity remedy,167 while avoiding disruption to improperly 
                                                            
under a federal criminal statute.  See, e.g., Smith, 124 U.S. at 533 (holding that 
defendant was not an “officer” for purposes of conversion charge); United States v. 
Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509, 512 (1878) (holding that defendant-surgeon was not an 
“officer” and thus could not be tried under extortion statute that applied to “[e]very 
officer of the United States”); Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 393–94 (holding that 
defendant was an officer within the Treasury Department when the Court considered  
defendant’s liability for embezzlement).  
 162. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 163. See id. at 140–41 (stating that executive functions can be “discharged only by 
persons who are ‘Officers of the United States’ within the language of that section”).   
 164. The Buckley Court permitted the FEC to continue its legislative functions, 
such as data collection and factual investigation, because Congress could delegate 
similar duties to congressional committees.  See id. at 138–41.  The Supreme Court 
may have permitted the FEC to continue its legislative functions because either (1) 
the entire agency was headed by inappropriately appointed commissioners and thus 
not a valid independent or executive agency, or (2) Congress was (too) involved in 
the selection of the FEC Commissioners’ appointment.  Cf. id. at 126–27 (noting that 
none of the commissioners’ appointments complied with the Appointments Clause); 
id. at 140–41 (holding that “present Commission” cannot perform quasi-legislative 
and quasi-judicial duties).  The Bureau, in contrast, is not threatened with wholesale 
invalidation, and the Director’s appointment is not invalid.  Thus, the Court may not 
permit the Deputy Director to exercise either legislative or executive functions.    
 165. Id. at 142. 
 166. Id. (“[T]he Commission’s inability to exercise certain powers because of the 
method by which its members have been selected should not affect the validity of the 
Commission’s administrative actions and determinations to this date . . . .” (citing 
City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 379 (1975) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549, 550–51 (1972) (per curiam); Ryan v. 
Tinsley, 316 F.2d 430, 431–432 (10th Cir. 1963); Schaefer v. Thomson, 251 F. Supp. 
450, 453 (D. Wyo. 1965), aff’d sub nom. Harrison v. Schaeffer, 383 U.S. 269 (1966))); 
see also Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 183–84 (1995) (distinguishing Buckley 
and narrowing its remedial provisions, refusing to “extend them beyond their facts,” 
when rejecting the application of a “de facto officer” doctrine commonly applied to 
statutorily improper appointments).    
 167. The Buckley Court’s de facto validation remedy “may be thought to have 
implicitly applied a form of the de facto officer doctrine.”  Ryder, 515 U.S. at 184.  
Although Buckley did not expressly rely upon the doctrine, the decision “validated the 
past acts of public officials.”  Id. at 183.  The Court explained that: 
The de facto officer doctrine confers validity upon acts performed by a person 
acting under the color of official title even though it is later discovered that 
the legality of that person’s appointment or election to office is deficient.  
[It] springs from the fear of the chaos that would result from multiple . . . 
suits challenging every action taken by every official whose claim to office 
could be open to question, and seeks to protect the public by insuring the 
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appointed agency officials, takes the wind out of an Appointments 
Clause challenge, as the Court later obliquely conceded.168  In Ryder v. 
United States,169 the Court explained that Buckley had relied upon 
apportionment decisions that had “held that legislative acts 
performed by legislators . . . elected in accordance with an 
unconstitutional apportionment were not therefore void.”170  The 
Court in Ryder narrowed the remedy in Buckley and the earlier 
apportionment cases by stating that those decisions concerned 
challenges to an entire legislative (or executive) body.171  A challenge 
to the Deputy Director’s appointment, unlike the apportionment and 
Buckley cases, challenges one office, not an entire agency.  The de-
facto doctrine, therefore, is unlikely to validate the Deputy Director’s 
actions.172   
Indeed, the better remedy in the context of an Appointments 
Clause challenge is to invalidate the actions of the improperly 
appointed officer.  If the remedy is not invalidation, it is difficult to 
see what impetus Congress or the President has to establish proper 
                                                            
orderly functioning of the government despite technical defects in title to 
office. 
Id. at 180 (quoting 63A AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers & Employees § 578, at 1080–81 
(1984)).   
 168. Cf. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 182–83 (“We think that one who makes a timely 
challenge to the constitutional validity of the appointment of an officer who 
adjudicates his case is entitled to a decision on the merits of the question and 
whatever relief may be appropriate if a violation indeed occurred.  Any other rule 
would create a disincentive to raise Appointments Clause challenges with respect to 
questionable judicial appointments.”). 
 169. 515 U.S. 177 (1995). 
 170. Id. at 183; see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 142. 
 171. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 183–84.  Besides pointing out that the “de facto officer” 
doctrine was limited to statutorily improper appointments, the Court also 
distinguished Ryder from Buckley on the ground that the former was a criminal case 
while the latter was civil.  Id.  This distinction lacks staying power.  In both contexts 
the appointment is improper and violates the Constitution.  Notably, the Court 
provided no reasoning for why this distinction was significant.  Cf. Kevin Sholette, 
Note, The American Czars, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219, 240 n.172 (2010) (“[I]n 
Appointments Clause challenges, the Supreme Court has chosen formalism over 
functionalism by rejecting the ‘de facto officer doctrine’ . . . .  The Court’s 
unwillingness to apply the de facto officer doctrine to Appointments Clause 
challenges jeopardizes the validity of any actions or decisions made by improper 
appointees.” (citing Ryder, 515 U.S. at 183; Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 536 
(1962))).   
 172. See Jonathan M. Miller, Courts and the Creation of a “Spirit of Moderation”:  
Judicial Protection of Revolutionaries in Argentina, 1863–1929, 20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 231, 247–48 n.64 (1997) (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court, while not denying the 
existence of the [de facto] doctrine, appears inclined to interpret de facto doctrine 
narrowly, so as to avoid creating a disincentive to the challenge . . .”).  But see Duffy, 
supra note 139, at 922 n.88 (noting that the de facto officer doctrine “contains a 
fundamental degree of flexibility that could make it attractive” for a court seeking to 
avoid difficult problems that arise from invalidation). 
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appointments—at least in the first instance.173  Moreover, “[t]he de 
facto officer doctrine is designed to address technical defects in 
officeholding,”174 such as clerical errors or statutory requirements.175  
But if the Deputy Director’s actions, despite the unconstitutional 
appointment, are simply accorded de facto validity, the 
Appointments Clause will promptly devolve into “etiquette or 
protocol” for the garden party that will be the federal government.176  
Invalidation, a material possibility and a more suitable remedy, could 
leave the Bureau paralyzed, especially if the Deputy Director assumes 
the Director’s duties during the Director’s absence.177   
The Director may not be able to mitigate the effect of the Deputy 
Director’s unconstitutional appointment, whether or not a court 
would invalidate certain past agency actions.  The Deputy Director’s 
functions (before or after a court’s invalidation of the appointment) 
could not simply be delegated to other employees.178  Those 
employees, by assuming such duties while subject to the Director’s 
oversight, would likely become inferior officers who must be 
appointed under the Appointments Clause.179  Likewise, the Director 
could not ratify the decisions of the Deputy Director (or an employee 
to whom the inferior officer’s duties were delegated) without 
rendering the Appointments Clause a dead letter as to inferior 
officers.  If such ratification were permissible, the Executive Branch 
would have little reason to comply with the Appointments Clause for 
either principal or inferior officers.180  
                                                            
 173. See Ryder, 515 U.S. at 183.  Although I concede that it is odd that the 
improper appointment of all of an agency’s commissioners has a more limited 
remedy than the improper appointment of one inferior official, the problem lies in 
the Court’s ineffectual remedy in Buckley—a remedy that the Court has indicated will 
be narrowly limited to its facts.  See id. at 184 (refusing to apply “de facto officer” 
doctrine to improperly appointed military judges). 
 174. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution:  Governing Without 
Authority, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 581, 596 (2001); see supra note 167 for a brief discussion 
of the de facto officer doctrine. 
 175. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 174, at 595 (“The effect, and purpose, is to 
prevent technical defects in an officer’s title, such as a clerical error or a failure to 
post a required bond, from having potentially disastrous effects on settled legal 
rights.”). 
 176. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) (quoting Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 177. See Sholette, supra note 171, at 240 n.172 (stating that without the de facto 
doctrine any decisions made by an improperly appointed officer may be invalidated). 
 178. See supra notes 28, 38–40 and accompanying text (reasoning any employee 
who undertakes authority equal to an “Officer of the United States” becomes an 
“Officer of the United States”). 
 179. See supra notes 28, 38–40 and accompanying text. 
 180. Perhaps the Executive Branch could argue that the Appointments Clause 
would remain important because the Deputy Director may not be able to be paid 
without a proper appointment.  But the Executive Branch would likely be able to 
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Perhaps the Director could, however, assign an improperly 
appointed Deputy Director supervisory power over the Bureau’s data-
collection powers.181  The Court in Buckley permitted an improperly 
appointed Federal Election Commission to perform investigative and 
data-collection functions because “those powers [are of the kind that] 
Congress might delegate to one of its own committees.”182  The 
Bureau’s duties to collect data—even if only for rulemaking 
purposes183—should be similarly “legislative” or, at least, “quasi-
legislative” in nature.184  If so, the individual performing these duties 
may not need to be appointed under the Appointments Clause.185  
Yet, depending on how the Director sets up the Bureau, this putative 
solution may be impractical.  
To preempt a quo warranto or other similar lawsuit by regulated 
entities,186 Congress can amend 12 U.S.C. § 5491 to require another 
method of appointment.187  But, in the context of an independent 
bureau within an independent agency, no perfect solution exists.  
Congress could, for instance, permit the Governors of the Federal 
Reserve to appoint the Deputy Director.  In light of Free Enterprise 
Fund, the Governors almost certainly constitute the head of a 
                                                            
create a position for the Deputy Director with other Executive Branch funds, either 
as an employee or, like Ms. Warren, as an Assistant to the President.  See Press 
Release, President Barack Obama, Presidential Statement on Signing the 
Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act 2011 (Apr. 15, 
2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/15/statement-
president-hr-1473 (arguing that the legislature’s attempt to limit the use of funds for 
several of the President’s staff violates the separation of powers).   
 181. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 1022(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1981–84 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.  
§ 5512) (delegating the task of data collection to the Bureau). 
 182. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137 (1976) (per curiam). 
 183. Dodd-Frank Act § 1022(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 1981–82 (to be codified at  
12 U.S.C. § 5512). 
 184. Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 137–38 (finding powers which are “essentially of an 
investigative and informative nature” powers that the Commission may still exercise 
(citing Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); McGrain v. 
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881))). 
 185. Id. at 137–38.  But see supra note 164 (explaining that the Buckley Court’s 
allowing of FEC officials to continue legislative tasks may not apply to the Deputy 
Director). 
 186. A writ of quo warranto “inquire[s] into the authority by which a public office 
is held.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1285 (8th ed. 2004). 
 187. See infra notes 190, 192, 194 and accompanying text (providing three separate 
ways of changing the method of appointment).  The suggestion that Congress alter 
the Deputy Director’s method of appointment is not quixotic.  When Professor John 
F. Duffy identified the unconstitutional appointment of administrative patent judges, 
Congress remedied the constitutional defect within approximately one year.  See 
Duffy, supra note 139, at 904 n.*, 918 n.72 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2006) (as amended 
in August 2008)). 
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department.188  Yet, by giving the Governors this prerogative, 
Congress must not only amend 12 U.S.C. § 5492, which currently 
denies the Federal Reserve power to appoint the Bureau’s officers or 
employees,189 but also render the Bureau less independent (and more 
prone to agency capture) than originally envisioned.190  A similar 
problem would arise if Congress placed the appointment power in 
the President alone.  The President could appoint a Deputy Director 
whose views are contrary to those of a Director appointed by a prior 
President191 and thereby reduce the agency’s independence.  
Congress may also be able to permit other heads of departments (or 
the courts of law) to choose the Deputy Director.  Yet, even if such an 
interbranch appointment is permitted,192 the independence of the 
Bureau is once again compromised.   
Congress’s final option requires that the President nominate the 
Deputy Director with the Senate’s advice and consent.193  This 
method of appointment, used for some deputies, may be the most 
palatable solution.194  The President’s choice would necessarily be 
approved by another branch of government, thereby limiting the 
President’s ability to choose a Deputy Director who is incompatible 
with the Director.195  The necessity for the Senate’s consent will very 
likely slow the appointment process and perhaps render the Deputy 
Director’s appointment more political and contentious than it would 
otherwise be.  But, considering Congress’ limited options, traditional 
confirmation is likely the best means of curing the Deputy Director’s 
potentially defective appointment.  
Even if the courts ultimately deem the appointment constitutional, 
as I suggest that they should, Congress should act now because of the 
stakes and timing.  The Bureau has been controversial since its 
inception, and moneyed financial institutions will be motivated to 
                                                            
 188. See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163–64 (2010) (holding 
that SEC Commissioners are, collectively, a department head). 
 189. Dodd-Frank Act § 1012(c)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1965–66 (to be codified at  
12 U.S.C. § 5491) (denying the governors the authority to “appoint, direct, or 
remove any officer or employee of the Bureau”). 
 190. See supra notes 11–17 and accompanying text (describing the statutory 
independence of the Bureau). 
 191. The Bureau’s Director is appointed for a five-year term, allowing for the 
possibility that the Director’s term will overlap the terms of two presidents.  See Dodd-
Frank Act § 1011(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491). 
 192. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 675, 677 (1988) (permitting interbranch 
appointments as long as they are not “incongruous”). 
 193. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 194. See supra note 78 (noting that the President, with the Senate’s advice and 
consent, appoints the deputies for FEMA). 
 195. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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limit the Bureau’s power.196  A determination that the Deputy 
Director’s appointment is unconstitutional could undermine 
numerous Bureau proceedings and actions.197  Changing the method 
of appointment removes one potential arrow from the Bureau’s 
opponents’ quiver.  And amending the statute now makes sense.  The 
Bureau is not scheduled to operate until the summer of 2011.198  
During this establishment period and the Bureau’s first months of 
operation, Congress should ensure that the Deputy Director’s 
appointment is unquestionably constitutional.199   
Of course, amending the Bureau’s organic act will lead opponents 
to seek other changes to the Bureau’s powers.  The Republicans, who 
gained control of the House of Representatives in January 2011, have 
already indicated that they plan to “revisit” the Bureau anyway.200  If 
they “revisit” the Bureau, Congress and the President may as well 
ensure that the Bureau’s powers are not later, and unnecessarily, 
called into doubt or invalidated.  Moreover, congressional 
                                                            
 196. See, e.g., Brush, supra note 108. 
 197. See supra note 173–179 and accompanying text. 
 198. See Fred Rivera, Consumer Protection Bureau Set to Take Flight July 21, 2011, 
FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION MONITOR (Sept. 21, 2010), 
 http://www.financialserviceslitigationmonitor.com/2010/09/articles/federal-
agencies/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-set-to-take-flight-july-21-2011/ 
(noting that the Bureau’s full regulatory powers do not commence until late July 
2011). 
 199. See supra notes 194–195 and accompanying text. 
 200. Dave Clarke & Rachelle Younglai, Republicans Want to Revisit Financial 
Regulation Reform Bill, INS. J. (Sept. 21, 2010), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2010/09/21/113382.htm; see also 
Jennifer Liberto, Wall Street Reform Stuck On Consumer Protection, CNN MONEY (May 6, 
2010 3:52 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/05/06/news/economy/consumer_protection/index.
htm (referring to disputes over the Bureau and its powers that Senators sought to 
negotiate prior to Dodd-Frank’s passage).   
Senator Richard Shelby (R–Ala.) said not only that “[t]he consumer agency 
bothers me the most,” but “I thought the creation of it and the way it was created was 
a mistake.”  Clark & Younglai, supra; see also Jon Prior, Bachmann Introduces Repeal of 
Dodd-Frank, Fires Back At Critics, HOUSING WIRE (Jan. 6, 2011 11:25 AM), 
http://www.housingwire.com/2011/01/06/bachmann-drops-dodd-frank-repeal-
ahead-of-criticism (reporting that Representative Michelle Bachmann (R–Minn.) 
introduced a bill to repeal Dodd-Frank and the Bureau); David Weidner, The 
Republican Eraser, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26, 2011 11:34 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704721104576106620934547598
.html (“If [the Republicans] can’t close the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
they want to make its chief accountable to Congress and its budget subject to the 
House Appropriations Committee.”). 
The White House has not ignored these potential threats to the Bureau.  Warren 
met with critics of the agency—both inside and outside of Congress—who seek either 
to weaken or “kill the agency.”  See Maya Jackson Randall, Warren Meets With Consumer-
Bureau Critics, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2011, 1:04 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703293204576106100404370190.h
tml.    
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reconsideration of Dodd-Frank may not be as painful as Democrats 
fear.  Although the public may have soured on Democrats generally, 
the public, as a whole, supports the Bureau,201 and a handful of 
Republicans has endorsed the Bureau.202  Ultimately, the Bureau may 
be better off taking its chances with Congress rather than the courts.   
CONCLUSION 
Although who or what, respectively, constitutes an “inferior officer” 
and a “department” may seem intuitive, these concepts suffer from 
ambiguity due to the Constitution’s text and judicial decisions.203  The 
relative rarity of appointment challenges provides few opportunities 
for courts to clarify these concepts, especially as to agency deputies.204  
Because of the indefinite contours of these terms, Congress must be 
exceedingly vigilant in ensuring that the agencies and offices that it 
creates comport with the Constitution.  
The appointment of deputies may seem, to Congress and perhaps 
many others, the stuff of minutiae and abstract technicalities.  But an 
unconstitutional appointment has practical consequences, even if the 
Supreme Court’s prior decisions provide mere clues as to precisely 
what the consequences will be.205  Whether the Deputy Director’s 
appointment is constitutional is a significant question that Congress 
and the President should confront now.  Permitting a controversial 
bureau to establish itself under a cloud of unconstitutionality is 
neither wise nor responsible. 
 
                                                            
 201. One survey indicates that 57% of Americans support the creation of a 
consumer-financial-protection bureau.  See Survey:  Americans Want Consumer Agency for 
Financial Products and Services, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., 1–3 (Sept. 9, 2009), 
http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/CFPA_Poll_Rel
ease_3_Sep_09_2009_final.pdf. 
 202. David Dayen, Dodd-Frank Passes House, FIREDOGLAKE (July 30, 2010 4:02 PM), 
http://news.firedoglake.com/2010/06/30/dodd-frank-passes-house/ (noting that 
Republican House Representatives Joseph Cao, Mike Castle, and Walter Jones voted 
for Dodd-Frank); Brady Dennis, Congress Passes Financial Reform Bill, WASH. POST, July 
16, 2010, at A01 (noting that Republican Senators Scott Brown, Susan Collins, and 
Olympia Snowe voted for Dodd-Frank). 
 203. See Bhagwat, supra note 40, at 983 (“The term ‘inferior,’ however, turns out to 
be somewhat more ambiguous than first appears . . . .”). 
 204. See supra Parts II & III. 
 205. See supra note 161. 
 
